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Causation and Physics
Cynthia K. W. Ma∗
Abstract
Philosophical analyses of causation take many forms but one major difficulty they all aim to
address is that of the spatio-temporal continuity between causes and their effects. Bertrand Russell
in 1913 brought the problem to its most transparent form and made it a case against the notion of
causation in physics. In this essay, I focus on this subject of causal continuity and its related issues
in classical and quantum physics.
I. Introduction
II. Causal Connotations and David Hume’s Theory of Causation
III. Russell’s Objection to Hume’s Temporal Contiguity Thesis
IV. Causal Continuity and Recent Physicalist Accounts of Causation
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I. Introduction
Causation is an active area of philosophical research and it is one notion that is deeply entwined
with the foundational aspects of both classical and quantum physics. One need not look far but only
at the contributions to this volume that causation and its related concepts abound in physics today.
When asked, “What is Causation? What do we mean when we think that one object is the
cause of another or one event causes another to happen?”, no doubt different connotations would
immediately come to mind. And indeed we ought to ask “What are the connotations of causation?”
These basic connotations, being largely empirical in character in the sense that they come from
our experience and interactions with the physical world, generally receive different treatments by
physicists and philosophers. The distinction is a matter of the difference in practice. Physicists accept
these basic intuitions as facts about causation and physical theories are constructed to conform to
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these “conditions of causality”, which are not to be violated. A good example would be that of the
“past-future” directed Minkowski light-cone structure defined in terms of “cause-effect” relations1.
Philosophers, on the other hand, approach the subject from a different angle; they conduct conceptual
analyses of these causal connotations and see whether they do make good logical sense or are infected
with grave inconsistencies. With the advent of relativity theories, physics has added important items
to the stock of causal facts. Perhaps the most significant one is that special relativity places a limit
on the velocity of propagation of causal influences. For the serious philosophical minds, these results
cannot afford to go unnoticed and it would indeed be of considerable interest to investigate the extent
of the possible interplay between the findings from the respective disciplines.
With this motivation in mind, the plan of this essay is as follows. In part II, I shall consider
a number of basic causal connotations and the various aspects that may be deduced from these
considerations. We are then be placed in a position which leads naturally to a presentation of the main
ideas of David Hume’s theory of causation. Hume’s theory is the start of the empiricist philosophical
analysis that aims to capture our causal intuitions. The Humean account and its more modern variants
collectively still represent the predominant philosophical view on causation. However, in a cleverly
written paper in 1913, Bertrand Russell was able to show that the Humean view is not entirely free
from inconsistencies given an important assumption on the nature of time. Russell’s argument will
be examined carefully in Part III. Part IV focuses on the issue of causal continuity and the recent
physicalist approaches to causation which attempt to resolve some of the more pressing difficulties
associated with this issue. This will then be followed by a brief conclusion of the main points discussed
and some speculative remarks in Part V.
To provide an overview of causation is well beyond the scope of this work but it is however my
modest aim to bring into focus, in the following pages, some major philosophical worries on the subject
which may be fairly regarded as one of the underlying puzzles encountered in the foundations of both
classical and quantum physics.
II. Causal Connotations and David Hume’s Theory of Causation
When one event (or something2) is regarded as the cause of another, we have “postulated”3 the
existence of a special relation or connection between the two events. How special is it? We may want
to emphasize the importance of such a connection by the expression that the event we have chosen
to call the cause and the one that is called the effect are necessarily connected to each other so that
had the cause not happened, the effect would not have happened either. Put slightly differently, this
counterfactual mode of representation of the special connection refers to an element of necessity in
the sense that given the cause, the effect “must” follow and any other situations just simply cannot
and would not happen.
How then are we to discover this necessary connection, whatever it may be? One useful place
to look is to start from our observations of how causes and effects behave generally. An obvious
observation is that “causes precede their effects”; namely, causes occur earlier in time than their
effects. One realises of course that not every pair of events happening at the same two respective
instants of time are to be thought of as causes and effects. A concrete everyday example illustrates
(Fig.1). Suppose we have two people, Angelo and Bianca, standing side-by-side in a room and Angelo
who is nearer to the light switch turns it on and at the same moment in time, Bianca starts to sing.
Even though both Angelo’s action and Bianca’s singing are both events happening prior to the lamp
being lit up, we would deem it appropriate to attribute the cause of the lamp lighting to the switching
action provided by Angelo but not to Bianca’s singing. Why? It is in part because a continuous
1See for example, Taylor and Wheeler (1966), Spacetime Physics, p.39.
2What kind of entities does the causal relation relate is an important aspect of philosophical analyses of causation.
Some argue that the “relata” should be events, while others insist that they may be facts, processes or states of affairs.
However, as both Hume and Russell take events as the proper causal relata, we may therefore consider events in the
present work.
3Notice I have deliberately used the word “postulated” because it is only correct to remain philosophically neutral
and avoid making undue assumptions from the outset.
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physical connection is envisaged between the light switch and the lamp and there is in general no
obvious and direct correlation between the processes of singing and the lamp lighting.
So temporal succession between two events alone is not a sufficient condition for causation. To
place the matter in a more scientific perspective, consider the Minkowski lightcone in Fig.2. Events Ej
and Ek
4 both lie in the future of the event Ei and hence are causally connectible to Ei since signals sent
from Ej can reach either Ej or Ek. However, neither Ej nor Ej is necessarily connected to Ei for there
need not be an existing connection after all. Whether there is in fact an actual connection depends
upon the existence of actual physical processes linking Ei to Ej and/or Ek. Therefore, temporal
succession and the spatio-temporal continuity between the cause and effect provided by
physical processes together seem necessary of causation.
Bianca
Angelo
Figure 1:
EjEk
Ei
Figure 2:
Granted the physical connection between the light switch and the lamp, is this connection really
necessary, in the sense that contrary situations are precluded from occurring? Unfortunately, the
answer is in the negative. Although it takes an awfully short time for the electrical signal to travel
from the light switch to the lamp, it is however always conceivable that an accident like a power cut
may occur within this short time interval, as a result of which the lamp would fail to light up. It is
therefore not necessarily the case that whenever the switch is turned on, the lamp must light up; this
is only true if no other factors are to interfere.
Let us imagine instead the scenario where Bianca is the only person in the room and there is no
light switch attached to the wall. We observe that when Bianca starts to sing the light comes on a split
second later. On one mere instance of this observation, it would be reasonable to put it down as a case
of sheer coincidence because we do not usually conceive of a possible (physical) connection between
these two events. However, if such an observation is repeated many times and in each and every
time, the same sequence obtains so that whenever Bianca starts to sing, the light comes on, then we
would conclude that the occurrences of both events in close temporal succession are too regular to be
discounted as pure chancy coincidences. And so from repeated observations of the regular succession
of the two events, we find it proper and indeed justified to “infer” a special connection (Fig.3) between
this pair of events and set out to search for the “hidden” mechanism that could have been responsible
for giving rise to such a correlation.
The question remains: is such a connection we have so inferred upon repeated observations of
regularities a necessary one? Although experience teaches us that frequent correlations are usually
prima facie good indicators of causation, it is however well-known that correlations do not have to
imply causation. Logic does not prohibit the apparent correlations we see as arising from pure chance.
One may well imagine the world to be a chancy enterprise in such a way that “it so happens” that
whenever E1 occurs, E2 follows later. Still, one may argue that quite unbeknown to us, there could
exist some kind of a voice-recognition device which provides the physical connection between Bianca’s
singing and the lighting up of the lamp. But what gives us the impression and prompts us to look
4These are treated as simultaneous events - lying on the same hyperplane - but the argument would remain valid
even if they do not.
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for this “unknown device” in the first place? Nothing other than the constant conjunction of the two
events of the singing and the lamp being lit - given the same cause, the same effect follows. Once
again, such a physical connection is by no means necessary as for instance, a power cut may occur
and tamper with the normal functioning of the device, thus rendering the succession of the two events
unattainable.
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Temporal succession of two events is not sufficient for causation. A case of causation is deemed
to obtain when temporal succession is supplemented by the presence of a spatially and temporally
continuous physical connection which provides the link between the two events in question. Similarly,
the situation where the same cause has found to be followed by the same effect on a great number
of occasions also gives us the feel of a causal correlation and induces us to look for an underlying
connection. It is in this way that it is often thought that spatio-temporal continuous physical processes
are essential for making sure that “the same cause is to be followed by the same effect”. Unforeseen
circumstances may happen during the spatial and temporal course of this continuous physical process
that frustrate the connection between the two events. Due to the absence of necessity, in the sense that
unforeseen circumstances can always occur, it follows that there can never be any guarantee without
fail that the same cause is to be followed by the same effect. This clearly indicates an incompatibility
between these two causal connotations and that in reality, “the same cause is always followed by the
same effect” is not warranted by spatio-temporal continuity. This is quite contrary to our ordinary
way of thinking.
Spatially and temporally continuous physical processes, though they are by no means necessary
connections (in a logical sense), do nevertheless impress upon us the idea of the existence of a causal
relation. Such physical connections between two events may either be (i) direct or, (ii) indirect. In the
latter case, we seek a third event C∗ that existed in the overlap region of the respective past lightcones
of the two events such that both events are direct consequences of C∗. In this model, both events are
effects of the common cause C∗ (Fig.4). This illustrates nicely the appeal of hidden variable programs
in the efforts to provide an explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox. Special
relativity rules out a direct physical connection between the two space-like separated measurement
events. However, the existence of the remarkable correlations of the results of measurements calls
urgently for an explanation. It is thus natural to look for possible common causes (hidden variables)
in the past which may have given rise to these correlations. But, while such a procedure may satisfy
one’s intellectual urge, logic permits a world in which these correlations are all there are; the empire
of chance rules in such a manner that the correlations always obtain even without any underlying
spatio-temporal continuous connection, be it direct or indirect. In fact, the significant achievement of
Bell’s 1964 inequalities rests on their success in dispelling local hidden variable models in favour of
quantum mechanics, as has since then been so forcibly confirmed by many sophisticated experiments.
In relation to the spatio-temporal continuity between causes and effects, another common connota-
tion we have for causation is to suppose that a certain cause event has occurred but nevertheless the
expected effect has somehow failed to materialize. Then we usually explain this by saying that other
events must have got in-between them which inhibited the occurrence of the effect. In other words,
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the spatio-temporal continuity between the supposed cause and the supposed effect is disturbed. In
order to diminish the opportunity for other events to get “in-between” and be mischievous, we want
to make both the spatial and temporal intervals between the cause and the effect as short as possible.
The shorter these intervals are, generally the smaller the probability for other factors to interfere. So,
causes and effects are expected to be spatially and temporally close to each other, that is, they should
exhibit a degree of spatio-temporal “nearness”. Remote factors are not immediate causes and it is
in this way that causal continuity is to be so intimately bound up with the notion of locality. For
events happening at vastly separated spacetime locations to be causally connected, we look for events
to provide the intermediate links between these two spacetime locales; hence the idea of a “causal
chain” to ensure causal continuity across spacetime regions.
The foregoing discussions now lead appropriately to the introduction of the major ideas of David
Hume’s theory of causation, which exerted tremendous influence over the logical positivists and their
contemporaries such as Bertrand Russell.
Hume maintains that there are two basic elements to human understanding that form the pillars
to his philosophical system: impressions and ideas. Impressions correspond to all “lively signals” we
receive from the physical world through our senses, like perceptions, sensations, feelings etc. Ideas,
on the other hand, consist in the formation of a conception of impressions. The general principle he
adopts for his philosophical analyses is that “all ideas originate from the association and combination
of the different impressions”. That is to say, a certain idea we may have for something has to come
from our experience through our senses.
Armed with this principle, he then asks from which impressions do we form the idea of cause-and-
effect as some sort of a necessary connection? He is able to identify three such impressions from our
empirical experience behaving like causes and effects. These are: “priority in time” of the cause ,
“constant conjunction” between the cause and effect and “contiguity” in space and time between
the causes and effects. And these should be of some familiarity since they refer to none other than
the three causal connotations we have considered in the above: causes precede their effects, given the
same cause, the same effect follows and continuity respectively. But as we have already discussed,
from these three properties and these three alone, one can never deduce the element of necessity.
Hume argued that even though there may actually exist connections in the world which are necessary
in some sense, beyond this the only real idea we can have of this connection is of the three properties
above. Since these properties are not sufficient to entail necessity, philosophical prudence must now
compel us to take a skeptical view of the idea of necessary connection between causes and effects.
Granted that our experience is incapable of furnishing us with the idea of a necessary causal
connection, how are we able to associate the three impressions of causes and effects to arrive at the
idea of a necessary connection between two events? Hume’s answer consists in the fact that after many
instances of observing the behaviours of constant conjunction, priority in time and contiguity in time
and space between the two events without exception, the mind has in the course grown accustomed to
expect that a special connection does indeed exist between the two. This feeling of expectation then
gives us the impression from which our idea of connection is copied. The idea is thus not from our
experiences of the external world but comes rather from our own response to it. In a sense then the
causal relation as a necessary connection is an idea “imposed” by the mind upon unfailing, successive
observations of these regular behaviours of causes and effects. The three impressions of priority in
time, constant conjunction and contiguity in time and space can never provide us with the idea of a
necessary connection.
It must again be emphasized that it is never Hume’s intention to deny the existence of necessary
connections in nature. Rather, that if the three impressions are all we have by way of the evidence
for causal necessity, and since this evidence alone is not adequate for us to serve to reveal to us such
an element of necessity, it would be more reasonable not to impose their existence on nature, leaving
this instead as an open question. And Hume concludes5,
5David Hume, (1888), A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition (1978), with revised text and notes by P.H.
Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (THN)
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“As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and
reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observed, that objects bear to each other the
relations of contiguity and succession; that like objects may be observed in several instances
to have like relations; and that all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations of
the understanding. But if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connection to
these objects; this is what we can never observe in them, but must draw the idea from what
we feel internally in contemplating them.” (THN, p.168-9)
III. Russell’s Objection to Hume’s Temporal Contiguity Thesis
In 1912, Russell made his presidential address6 to the Aristotelian Society the occasion to cast
doubt on the tenability of the Humean account of causation and to argue against the notion of cause
in physics.
We have already taken pains to stress the inherent incompatibilities among the three causal im-
pressions of priority in time, contiguity in space and time and constant conjunction. In particular, it
has been indicated that given the absence of the ingredient of necessity, spatio-temporal continuity is
not really capable of ensuring the constant conjunction of the causes and effects. The main reason for
this is that even if there is a continuous spatio-temporal physical process connecting the cause and
the effect, anything can still happen during the time interval when the causal influence is transmitted
down the connection and this results in an uncertainty in the production of the effect. The light switch
and the lamp in the last section form a good example. This is why events which are too removed
from each other in both the spatial and temporal dimensions are not considered as reliable causes and
effects.
An immediate solution would be to require that both the spatial and temporal distances between
the two events be decreased to such an extent that they stand “adjacent” (or contiguous) to each
other so that we may have the assurance that other factors cannot impose themselves and thwart the
occurrence of the effect. But what exactly does one mean by two events being “adjacent” to each other
when embedded in a background of spacetime continuum? The notion of spatial contiguity between
two events is easily satisfied and in the limit it is met by the case where two events can occupy the
same location when happening at different times. The notion of temporal contiguity is however more
problematic since given that two events occur at the same spatial location with one after another,
how are we to ensure that they are temporally contiguous to each other? So this problem reduces to
one which concerns temporal contiguity and this is indeed the important issue addressed by Russell
in his paper.
Russell’s argument begins with a statement of the temporal contiguity thesis (TC). The properties
of priority in time and temporal contiguity between cause and effect can be summarised as follows:
TC: “Whenever the first event (cause) ceases to exist, the second comes into
existence immediately after.”
To place TC in the correct perspective, Russell makes the major assumption that time is to be
modeled as a mathematical continuum (MC) and is therefore considered as a dense series. A dense
series has the distinctive feature that the notion of a “next point” does not make sense because between
any two points there always exists others, no matter how close these two points are to each other. It
is instructive to contrast the idea of a dense series such as the real number line with the discrete series
of positive integers where the notion of consecutive (or “next”) members does take on a well-posed
meaning. Having specified how the temporal continuum is to be represented, we now consider two
point events c and e occurring at two respective instants of time t1 and t2 (t1 < t2). Because time
is a dense series, it follows that between any two instants (points) of time, there are always other
instants (points) no matter how short we make the interval t2− t1. That is, there is always a temporal
6Delivered on 4 November 1912. The ensuing essay was published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13
(1912-13) and reprinted in Russell, B. (1917), Mysticism and Logic, p.180-208, George Allen and Urwin.
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gap between c and e and hence c cannot be contiguous in time to e. Furthermore, this temporal gap
provides ample opportunities for other events to creep in between c and e and to interfere. While
these other factors may not prove harmful to the production of e at t2, they may however also behave
otherwise and hinder the occurrence of e (Fig.5). Under these circumstances, one cannot be certain
that the same cause is always followed by the same effect since there can always be the chance of e
not occurring whenever there is to be this temporal gap between the two events.
In order to be rid of unsolicited factors, one must devise a means to ensure that the temporal gap
is filled. An obvious way is to suppose the cause event as having a temporal dimension (Fig.6). The
cause is now a static, unchanging event7, occupying the half-open interval, and is imagined to sit there
from time t1 to t2, filling the temporal gap and all of a sudden, turns into e at t2. However, Russell
objects strongly to such kinds of events: he argues that it is not at all logical why, being unchanging
and sitting there complacently, c has to turn into e at t2 and not at any other moments, say earlier
at t0 or later at t3?
c e
c1 c2 c3
c1 c2c3
c1c2
c e ec
c3
Figure 5:
c e
t0
t1 t2
t3
Figure 6:
And so static, unchanging events are dismissed outright by Russell as an impossibility. Since
these static, unchanging events which seem to be the only means by which the temporal gap can be
occupied are not plausible, we must therefore draw the conclusion that there always exists a temporal
gap between c and e so that c cannot be contiguous to e. Our intuition about the temporal continuity
of causes and effects comes under threat given the assumption of physical time as a mathematical
continuum and constant conjunction cannot be guaranteed under such a circumstance. Russell has
succeeded in showing that there exist tremendous tensions between our usual connotations of the
causal relation.
VI. Causal Continuity and Recent Physicalist Accounts of Causation
Despite the difficulty brought to light by Russell’s critique of the Humean temporal contiguity
thesis, one is, of course, allowed to argue that the major issue is really the definition of events as
points occurring at discrete temporal instants within the temporal continuum. There is simply no
place for the notion of discreteness with a temporal continuum. So, a more amicable approach would
be to “superpose” a continuum of events - a continuous rope of events - upon this temporal continuum
in the sense that we consider all the events that happen locally within this time interval. Here we
focus more closely on the aspect of causal continuity by first considering this example from Elizabeth
Anscombe8 (1974, p.150): “Find an object here and ask how it comes to be there?” (Fig.7)
A causal explanation, says Anscombe, would be “it went along some path from A to B”. The
locution “along some path” in fact entails more than the case where the object just turned up at
7If a non-static, changing event such as one composed of a causal chain of discrete events as in Fig.5, then the
problem of temporal gaps existing in-between these events within the causal chain remains.
8Anscombe, E (1974), ”Times, Beginnings and Causes” in the Proceedings of the British Academy. Reprinted in
G.E.M. Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Volume II, p.148-162.
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Before After
Figure 7:
location B after having been at A previously. It requires the object to occupy also all the intermediate
positions between A and B. To satisfy constant conjunction, it is sufficient for the object to turn
up at location B after having been at A some moments earlier and without having to assume the
intermediate positions between the two locations. But this would not be deemed to be an adequate
causal explanation. And to “explain causally”, a path has to be imposed to provide the connection
between the two events of the object being at the two respective spacetime locations. For the purpose
of explanation, it is therefore proper to consider spatio-temporal continuous connections when thinking
about causation.
In physics, the notion of continuity is usually either represented by spatially and temporally con-
tinuous paths or by trajectories in phase space. These spacetime paths and phase space trajectories
are in turn the solutions of differential and integral equations. Recalling the fact that while these
differential and integral equations guarantee continuity, they however lack the crucial causal aspect of
an explicit temporal order for cause and effect.
The pressing question which must now occupy us is how we may introduce a temporal order into a
theory of causation which takes seriously the view that spatio- temporal continuous physical processes,
as represented by the equations of physics, provide for us the appropriate causal connections.
We find a clue in the following consideration of the Minkowski lightcone (Fig.8),
P
B
A
?
Figure 8:
Does it make sense to assign a temporal direction from the past to future as directing from the
lower-half of the lightcone towards the upper-half and not vice versa? In other words, does it make
any sense to provide the worldline as going through the worldpoints A , B with an arrow and to assert
that B is before P and A after P? Einstein asks in 19499, “Is what remains of temporal connection
between world-points in the theory of relativity an asymmetrical relation, or would one be just as much
justified, from the physical point of view, to indicate the arrow in the opposite direction and to assert
that A is before P, B after P?” Physics has a ready reply to this. The “temporal arrow” is secured
by the observations of irreversible processes in nature despite the much advertised time- symmetrical
character of the laws of physics. These processes are believed to be ultimately related to the growth
of entropy in the universe. The “past-future” direction of the lightcone may equally well be defined in
terms of either the direction of the cause-effect relation or that of irreversible processes. This suggests
that the causal direction may indeed be identified with the direction of irreversible processes. Or put
9Einstein A (1949), “Reply to Criticisms” in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, p.687-688, The Library of Living
Philosophers Volume VII, Edited by P.A. Schilpp, Open Court.
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differently, a cause can be considered as an event which introduces a “change” which is irreversible.
The idea of a cause as an irreversible change forms the backbone of the physicalist theories of
causation. Although there are variations amongst the theories of physical causation that have been
put forward, they nevertheless share one basic underlying idea: causal continuity is guaranteed by
the transmission of causal influences (objective physical quantities) along continuous space-time paths
governed by physical laws. The “objective physical quantities” being transferred refer usually to either
momentum or energy in the class of approaches subsumed under the title of “transference theories of
causation”. A slightly more sophisticated version is the so-called “process-theory” of Wesley Salmon10;
there it refers to the transmission of marks with the marks being changes that have resulted from
irreversible physical interactions.
Interactions are responsible for bringing about or producing the irreversible changes. To cast this
concept in a better context, consider the simple case of one mass in motion colliding with another
which is initially at rest, subsequently setting the second into motion (Fig.9).
M
M
m
m
v
v
Figure 9:
The same state of affairs can be described by two different causal stories. In the rest frame of m
the moving mass M travelling with velocity v appears to be the earlier event - the cause which is
responsible for the change of states of both masses. On the other hand, in the rest frame of M, the
earlier event of m moving with velocity -v is now regarded as the cause giving rise to the subsequent
change of motion of both masses. Hence, we find ourselves confronted by two different causal stories
whose accuracies depend on the frame of reference in which the same state of affairs is viewed. The
objective matter-of-fact is however that for all inertial frames of reference, the “collision” between M
and m produces the subsequent “changes” of motion of each of the masses. It is important to realise
that the collision occurs in all frames of reference and after which is to be followed by changes in
motions of these masses. It is indeed by this very means that an objective temporal order may indeed
be established. Because of this “causal interaction” between the masses M and m, their respective
energies and momenta are correlatively modified accordingly. Both masses, having interacted, will
carry the causally modified dynamical properties via their continuous spatio-temporal trajectories
and may participate in further interactions (Fig.10).
M m
m*
Figure 10:
10Salmon, W C (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press.
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This picture of causation, central to the physicalist approaches, must be modified when it is
carried over to the quantum regime. There, the idea of a physical system following strict continuous
trajectories has long evaporated and in its place stands instead a series of discrete points corresponding
to specific measurement events performed on the system. The inherent probabilistic nature of the
quantum world involving interference does not sanction any definite interpolation between these points.
Measurement is after all a kind of interaction between the system and the measuring apparatus that
brings about an irreversible change to both.
Even though one may now find the notion of continuity dubious in this domain, the concept of
causal interaction survives seemingly unscathed in the face of probabilistic indeterminism. In-between
measurements, the system is described by the continuous evolution of the wavefunction as governed
by the Schro¨dinger equation. However, this continuous evolution refers only to a distribution of
the different probabilities of obtaining various outcomes of the measurements of a certain dynamical
observable. It does not represent an evolution of the successive dynamical values as “possessed” by the
system in time as in the classical case. Quantum mechanically, the very act of measurements brings
about irreversible changes of the state of a physical system and so interactions can be thought of as
the cause as a result of which the probability distributions of the values of dynamical observables are
altered. This is similar to the picture suggested independently by Rudolf Haag11 in a series of papers
which take the view that in the regime of low density, quantum field theory describes a world where
events are the collision processes between particles and the particles themselves provide the causal tie,
i.e., the causal connection carrying the modified dynamical structure.
V. Concluding Remarks
Scientists seek causes for the purpose of providing scientific explanations. It is often regarded
that effects follow necessarily from causes. Indeed, it is the major contribution of Hume’s theory of
causation to show that this is where we err and the inference from causes to effects is not deductive
but rather inductive in nature. This immediately calls into question the idea of a necessary connection
which is thought to be the vital element of causal relations. Russell went further and showed that there
clearly exist inconsistencies when we consider the causal relation as one between events happening at
discrete temporal intervals superposed upon the temporal continuum.
Advocates of the class of the so-called physicalist approaches to causation provide a promising
framework for a theory of physical causation in the face of Hume’s and Russell’s problems. The
problematic “temporal gap” in Russell’s analysis is closed by the consideration of a continuum of
events so that the temporal continuum can be matched by the spatio-temporal continuous character
of physical processes. Causes, in these accounts, are interactions which bring about irreversible changes
from which a causal order can be defined. This picture works well in the domain of classical physics
and requires appropriate modifications when applied to the quantum regime.
Perhaps I should now leave the reader with the following thought. The most startling case for
causation is that of spontaneous decay where an atom sits there for a while and then undergoes decay.
These are conceived to be “uncaused” events by most philosophers because the time when the atom is
to decay cannot be known with exactitude. Might the nucleus resemble Russell’s “static, unchanging”
event12, sitting there for a period of time and suddenly undergoing decay? Recalling that the major
assumption that Russell makes is that time is to be viewed as a mathematical continuum, it would be
a most interesting investigation to see whether adopting instead a picture of time as discrete units will
shed different light on this problem. Once again, this illustrates how deeply the notion of causation
is connected with the very nature of space and time.
11See, for example, Haag, R (1990), “Fundamental Irreversibility and the Concept of Events”, Commun. Math.
Phys., 132, p.245-251.
12It has been kindly pointed out to me by Professor Morton Rubin that the atom is not really “unchanging” in
Russell’s sense: previous interactions with the vacuum must be present in order to ”prepare” the nucleus in an unstable
state in the first place. However, I would argue that this does not weaken the thrust of Russell’s argument, namely
that even given that we have a changing event, how might one explain how the atom comes to decide at which exact
moment in time it should undergo decay?
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